Neil Fraser
May 17, 2004
1996 MARKED the beginning of the first real process of urban revitalisation in the Johannesburg City Centre. Today the results of the process are becoming more and more visible as it steadily gains momentum. Prior efforts to deal with the degradation that started in the 1970s and accelerated through the '80s and '90s, were viewed as illegitimate as the local governments that spawned them. In mid-1997 the then-Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, enunciated the first 'democratic' vision for the city centre. Known as 'The Golden Heartbeat of Africa', the vision had been negotiated over the previous 18 months between the first representative local and provincial governments and organisations representing community, labour and business.
Over the next few years their joint focus turned to developing structures and strategies that would facilitate implementation and attainment of the vision. An 'Inner City Spatial Framework' was developed in 1999 together with an 'Inner City Economic Development Framework' followed in 2000 by a 'City Centre Development Framework'. All of these were essential building blocks for the foundation, from which the urban renewal process could be launched.
In 2000, the process received a massive boost when the city's first executive mayor, Amos Masondo, announced that the inner city was to be one of the six priorities of his term of office. A councillor on his Mayoral Committee, Sol Cowan, was appointed with specific responsibility for the Inner City, the only appointee with a geographic portfolio on what is in essence the Mayor's Cabinet. All Council departments and agencies, a number of which had treated the inner city previously as a step-child, now were required to focus on this mayoral priority.
The Johannesburg Development Agency was established as the City's implementation authority with an initial remit for the inner city. The Council's Region 8 (Inner City) office was also established. It proceeded to set up an Inner City Task Force to co-ordinate and drive Council's services management and by-law enforcement. The provincial government came to the party through their initiative to develop Gauteng as the 'Smart Province', channelling funds into strategic inner city projects via Blue IQ, their financial intermediary. Business, recognising the emergence of a strong political will backed by serious public-sector funding, became willing to once again invest, not just in their own enterprises, but in upgrading and maintaining public space and providing new amenities. Private investors, sensing that the downward cycle had been largely halted, started moving in to benefit from the now palpable up-turn in the inner city's fortunes.
The value of building plans approved in 2002 (R122 467 million) was six times that of the previous year (R19 441 million) while the private sector component (R57 100 million) was nearly three times that of the previous year (R18 900 million). Since 2002 an unofficial scorecard reflects R 3.5 billion of new investment (slightly less than half from the private sector), not including the value of existing property changing hands which could be between R1 and R2 billion. Not bad for a city that many have written off time and again as a basket case!
An analysis of investment over the past two years reveals, inter alia, (i) growing private sector residential interest, with projects ranging from middle income rental units (R1 500.00 to R2 500.00 per month) to high income sectional title units (R350 000.00 to over R1 million) (ii) heavy public sector spending on infrastructure - the Constitutional Court, Nelson Mandela Bridge, Metro Mall and Faraday markets and transportation facilities, the Hillbrow Medical Precinct (iii) private sector investment in parking provision - in excess of 8 000 bays have recently been completed or are under construction - and in the upgrading of public space - Braamfontein, Main Street, Hollard Street, the Sappi Park in Braamfontein (iv) public sector investment in commercial space and upgrading of related public areas - the Provincial Government Precinct (v) private sector commercial investment - the Sappi Headquarters consolidation in Braamfontein, Standard Bank Superblock growth and (vi) economic precinct support and development - Jewel City, Fashion District, Newtown. The list goes on!
Some may say that we have merely been undergoing the inexorable cycle of decay and regeneration that many cities experience during their existence, that the current resurgence was inevitable. That is not so. Urban decay is like a disease, a malaise that spreads with frightening rapidity if allowed to go unchecked. The cure must be directed at the cause and not at the symptoms, or recovery will not be sustainable. Progress must not just be discernible, but measurable. The process has continued to be directed by strategies and programmes agreed between all the players, public and private. In 2002 the previous strategies and plans were integrated under the long-term economic vision for the metropole, 'Joburg 2030'. This resulted in the Inner City Regeneration Strategy adopted in 2003 and from this has recently emerged a Business Plan for the Inner City covering the financial years 2004 to 2007, which is to be laid before the Mayoral Committee for approval during the next few weeks.
The Inner City Regeneration Strategy adopted in 2003 has a simple goal of which the private sector can only be supportive: "to raise and sustain private investment leading to a steady rise in property values". Four years ago, visiting American city guru, Richard Bradley, stated that the attraction and sustainability of investment was predicated on three fundamentals; (i) conditions for investment must be competitive and fair relative to the operation of the market (ii) they must be understandable, requiring clarity of intentions and transparency of purpose and (iii) they must be predictable, demanding consistent actions that are dependable and generating decisions and actions that are a logical output. Thus, the goal of the Strategy is to be achieved through five major thrusts or objectives: addressing 'sinkholes', promoting 'ripple-pond' investments, maintaining and upgrading the infrastructure, undertaking intensive urban management and supporting economic sectors. Now the Business Plan defines the programmes and activities, some 63 in number, that flow from the objectives. Each has a time frame and budget and, hopefully, will find favour and funding approval through the Mayoral Committee.
Notwithstanding any new initiatives that will result from the Business Plan when approved, the regeneration process outlined has already resulted in the major investments previously quantified. This is not to say that there are still not areas of major concern. Criminal activity, though markedly reduced over the past decade, is still too high and the performance of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department is not yet at an acceptable level. Urban blight, with residential overcrowding and illegal occupations, pock-marks the Inner City fabric; unmanaged informal trading and taxis exacerbate a largely gritty public environment and serious social problems associated with poverty are still rampant. Government has yet to satisfactorily address the plight of the urban poor and the issue of meaningful, sustainable job creation.
Nevertheless, the City Regeneration Strategy of 2003 and its subsequent Business Plan are the result of nearly a decade of focused energy and partnership between the public and private sectors who recognise the economic and strategic significance of the Inner City of Johannesburg. It will never again be what its mining camp, colonial and apartheid history once dictated - but, through this energy and partnership, it is steadily moving towards its vision as it emerges as one of the great cities of this continent - an African World Class City.
